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BOOK REVIEW
Whither to Regulate?
Public Policy Toward Cable Television: The Economics
of Rate Controls, by Thomas W. Hazlett and
Matthew L. Spitzer, The MIT Press and The AEI
Press, 1997, 253 pages.
Reviewed by Patrick A. Miles, Jr.*
To paraphrase William Shakespeare: to regulate or not to regulate,
that is the question. Legislators, regulators, economists, and policy ana-
lysts have struggled with that question in connection with cable television
rates for some time. The struggle is demonstrated by the pendulum swings
from no regulation, to local regulation, to deregulation, to reregulation,
and-as of March 31, 1999 -back toward deregulation. Why the regula-
* Partner, Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett L.L.P., Grand Rapids, Michigan.
J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1991; B.S. in Business Administration and Econom-
ics, Aquinas College, 1988. Mr. Miles specializes in telecommunications and cable televi-
sion law. He counsels state and local governments nationwide on telecommunications and
cable television matters, including franchising, transfers, renewals, wireless communication
tower/antenna leases, and permitting. He also represents municipalities in cable television
rate regulation matters and proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission.
1. In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress eliminated rate regulation of ca-
ble programming services (the tier of service composed of satellite channels-such as CNN,
ESPN, A&E, MTV, or USA Network-which is sometimes called "Tier II," "expanded ba-
sic," or "enhanced basic") effective March 31, 1999. 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4) (Supp. II 1996).
Basic cable rate regulation was not to be affected by that sunset provision. In general, the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 bifurcated rate regula-
tion responsibility: Local franchise authorities have jurisdiction over basic cable rates, and
the Federal Communications Commission handled regulation of cable programming serv-
ices tier rates. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, § 3(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
543(a)(2)(A) (1994)). Premium channels like HBO, ShowTime, and pay-per-view movies
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tory indecision? At least two factors contribute to a possible answer. First,
the cable television industry affects several important constituents-all
with disparate interests. Consumers, broadcasters, programmers, local
governments, and cable operators have strong voices and opinions that are
heard and followed at different times by policymakers. Second, cable is a
unique growth industry with an ever-changing product. Some view cable
television operators as monopolists that provide an essential utility serv-
2ice. Others view cable television as a luxury item in competition with
movie theaters or video rental stores for entertainment spending. Regard-
less of which viewpoint is taken, the history of cable television rate regu-
lation, deregulation, and reregulation shows that political winds can shift
dramatically in a relatively short period of time.
Rather than asking the Shakespearean question of whether to regu-
late, Public Policy Toward Cable Television: The Economics of Rate Con-
trols3 asks and attempts to answer what its authors consider to be the two
most relevant questions: (1) "What can regulators regulate?" and (2)
"What is the effect of price controls on consumer welfare?" 4 In doing so,
the book uses the empirical results of rate regulation to conclude that an
unregulated cable monopoly is better than a regulated monopoly.
5
This assiduously written book by economics professor Thomas W.
Hazlett and law professor Matthew L. Spitzer gives a fairly sound, but
mostly esoteric, economic analysis of the deregulatory effect of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (1984 Cable Act). The book provides
a similarly detailed economic and financial analysis of the immediate ef-
fect of cable television rate regulation implemented by the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) under the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act). The book then
comes down from the Ivory Tower of economic analysis and examines
some of the ground-level political forces and policy decisions that led to
the 1992 Cable Act as well as the subsequent calls for legislative action,
which resulted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The book also
contains a succinct glossary of relevant terms for those uninitiated to cable
television industry jargon. The authors state their purpose as follows: "We
and events are not subject to rate regulations.
2. Indeed, cable system delivery of television developed in the 1950s in the remote
mountainous areas of the United States where broadcast signals could not easily reach tele-
vision set antennas. Community antenna television (CATV) was the only means by which
people in such areas could receive television broadcasts.
3. THOMAS W. HAzLm-r & MATrHEW L. SPrrZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOwARD CABLE
TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS (1997).
4. Id. at 1-2.
5. Id. at216-17.
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have tried to write a book that will be accessible to the wide range of indi-
viduals who have an interest in the subject matter.",6 In this regard, they
succeeded. The book, by its own admission in the preface, was written for
"policymakers, journalists, telecommunications industry analysts, and aca-
demic economists. 7 Given the lack of insight into specific cable television
laws and FCC regulations, however, experienced practitioners of cable
television law most likely will not find the book of much practical use
other than as an interesting and general background reference. The book
seems aptly suited as a complementary textbook or industry case study in
an administrative law, cable television law, or undergraduate economics
class.
The information and data presented by the authors are impressive and
provide a useful resource for members of the intended audience. Yet, one
drawback is that most of the compiled information was garnered from ca-
ble industry-friendly publications. Results of government studies are also
utilized occasionally. The authors appear to have not undertaken the task
of developing their own independent empirical research studies; and, for
whatever reason, there is a dearth of information generated by pro-
consumer groups or associations. Nevertheless, economists will find suffi-
cient graphs, tables, and charts supporting and analyzing the authors' data
to suppress any allegation that this book is merely an anecdotal, qualitative
position paper. But the lack of diverse and independent research is disap-
pointing, especially since the book's research effort appears sincere and
diligent.
The book begins by reviewing the recent debate over cable rate
regulation, including reciting arguments and positions from applicable
economic literature and studies.9 It notes with some dismay that the critical
question of "What can regulators regulate?" was never posed or answered
in any of the legislative debate over cable television regulation.0 The
authors take some umbrage that the answer to that question was simply as-
sumed:
Indeed, the burden of proof is not upon those who seek regulation to
lower prices, but upon those who would assert competition as an alter-
native short- or long-term policy. As we shall see, where head-to-head
rivalry does exist in cable, rates are substantially lower in quality-
adjusted terms.1
6. Id. at xi.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 15, 53.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
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Next, the book examines cable operator market power in multichan-
nel video markets.12 The authors go to some length to prove quantitatively
that cable is a profitable business. They note, "The evidence strongly sug-
gests that, at least since the mid- to late 1980s, cable operators price well
above marginal and average costs and earn returns significantly above
competitive levels."' 3 The conclusion is that "[c]able would thus appear to
be a prime candidate for rate regulation that would lower consumer prices
and expand the volume of sales."'
4
Hazlett and Spitzer even make a strong argument that cable, although
exhibiting "marked tendencies toward monopolistic market structure,"'5 is
not a natural monopoly. 6 "[M]arket demand for cable is able to financially
sustain two competitors at current (or recent) prices in the typical U.S.
market.' 7 They note that contrary to conventional thought, facilities-based
cable competition actually can increase total subscribership (known as
penetration) in a particular community.' This conclusion runs counter to
typical thinking, which posits that an incumbent (and entrenched) cable
service provider operates at or near the maximum penetration level.' 9 Thus
a potential competitor must plan on "stealing" cable subscribers from the
incumbent, and to do so, the competitor must offer a better product at a
lower price. Because the costs of obtaining a return on the capital expen-
ditures required to construct a competing cable system are so high, com-
petition is curtailed. This capital spending requirement, the thinking goes,
creates a barrier to entry because earning a likely and sufficient return on
investment is too difficult. The book uses empirical studies to show that
cable competition can create a win-win-win situation for the incumbent,
the new entrant competitor, and consumers. 20 This book makes a compel-
ling and sound argument that cable competition can generate additional
demand.
Instead of looking at the financial barrier to entry discussed in the
preceding paragraph, the book focuses on regulatory barriers to entry-
namely, state and local franchising.2' It relies on federal government re-
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 21.
14. Id. at 41.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 38.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 95, 208.
21. State and local governments can grant franchises (or permission) to cable compa-
nies to use public rights-of-way to provide cable service. Public rights-of-way (i.e., streets,
[Vol. 51
WHITHER TO REGULATE?
ports that conclude local franchising creates a significant barrier to entry
for competing cable companies.2 But this conclusion is never supported
with firm data or reasoning and, frankly, is debatable. Most state laws and
the 1992 Cable Act specifically prohibit exclusive cable franchises.23 In-
deed, many state and government officials desire cable competition be-
cause it generally results in constrained cable rates and improved customer
service, which benefit constituents. The authors concede that cable opera-
tors disdain competition and use tactics such as exclusive programming
contracts and predatory pricing in an attempt to defeat a new entrant. The
authors blame franchising as a barrier to entry without acknowledging that
the apparent monopoly of cable could be viewed as an implicit non-
aggression pact among the handful of cable operators to avoid encroaching
another's service territory. In any event, this ancillary issue is not exam-
ined deeply.
The authors do provide support for the claim that the 1984 Cable Act
did little if anything to stimulate competition. They argue that the 1984
Cable Act actually solidified many cable operators' monopoly position. 2
Further, they characterize the cable industry as "blessed" in the mid-1980s
with a favorable regulatory environment consisting of: (1) broad First
Amendment rights to select programming; (2) complete rate deregulation
by the end of 1986; (3) secure property rights in cable franchises including
a presumption or expectation of renewal; (4) passage in many states of
"so-called level playing field laws" to create regulatory hurdles for new
entrants; and (5) codification in the 1984 Cable Act of the FCC's 1970
telephone company/cable television cross-ownership ban prohibiting tele-
phone companies from competing in delivery of local video service.
The book zeroes in on the second "blessing." The Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984 effectively deregulated cable television rate
regulation with an expansive view of "effective competition."' 27 The 1984
Cable Act "preempted local, state, or federal rate controls in any commu-
nity where the FCC found 'effective competition' to exist." 2 "Effective
alleys, easements, etc.) are the most efficient land-based means to construct and operate a
cable system throughout a community.
22. See, e.g., HAzLur & SpIZ ER, supra note 3, at 39 ("The National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration concluded that municipal franchising was responsible
for significant [cable operator) market power .... ).
23. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, § 7(a)(1) (codified at47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994)).
24. H1AzLurr & SP=R, supra note 3, at 29.
25. Id. at 56.
26. Id. at 57-58.
27. Id. at 55-56.
28. Id. at 55.
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competition" was present "whenever three over-the-air broadcast televi-
sion systems were available"-a very low threshold met in about 96.5 per-
cent of U.S. cable systems.
In Chapter Five, The Economic Effects of Deregulation, 1987-1992,
the authors assert that although "the nominal price of cable television
service rose in the post-1986 period... [by] nearly 61 percent for basic
cable," during the "fifty-two-month interval between November 30, 1986,
and April 1, 1991, ' O such "price increases were driven-and matched-by
quality improvements."3 The authors cite to cable network subscriber
growth as well as expanded penetration rates as indicia of the quality im-
provements.33 The authors conclude that the data evidences regulation
"influenc[ing] the level of [cable] business risk, which influences invest-
ments in program and infrastructure quality, and those, in turn, influence
consumer demand for cable television service."
34
Unfortunately, the authors only give cursory mention to so-called ex-
ogenous factors as possible alternative (or associated) reasons for the
growth.35 In other words, the book looks to superficial cable operator ac-
tivity in response to deregulation, such as increased investments vis- t-vis
subscriber behavior, without analyzing the underlying motives. The book,
which shows a commanding use of academic economics, never addresses
the presence or lack of utils36-- a basic economic concept-to demonstrate
or measure the value customers place on cable services. The book relies on
price changes, revenue growth, and penetration rates to show the results of
deregulation. No survey data or other consumer information is proffered to
confirm that in subscribers' collective view, the quality of cable television
service increased, which caused more people to subscribe to cable televi-
sion in the deregulatory period. The authors leave the question unanswered
of whether and to what extent, if any, exogenous factors, such as consum-
ers' desire for better reception, full use of cable-ready television sets, or
technology improvements, contributed to subscriber and network expan-
sion.
29. Id. at 55-56.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 101.
32. Id. at 86.
33. Id. at 80.
34. Id. at 76.
35. See id.
36. The term "utils" or "utility" is used by economists as a measure of satisfaction. H.
CRAIG PETERSEN & N. CRIs LEWIS, MANAGERIAL ECONoMics 467 (3d ed. 1994).
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The book merely asserts that increased subscribership and penetra-
tion imply product quality improvements.37 It may or may not, but the
question is never addressed. The level of analysis and detailed economic
and financial data that the authors used elsewhere could have been used in
this regard to confirm a direct causal link between cable growth (i.e., con-
sumer satisfaction) and quality. For example, statements like the following
demonstrate that the authors are adept at ascertaining the effect on con-
sumers, but do not delve far into the murky waters of explaining consumer
behavior:
Under the assumption that linear demand curves shift parametri-
cally, however, it is clear that penetration rate changes are perfectly
correlated with consumer surplus changes. When price and quality rise
(or fall) together, the net effect on consumers can be gleaned from
whether penetration rises or falls. An increase in penetration indicates
that consumers consider the price-quality package preferred in the in-
stance where penetration is rising; the reverse is indicated when pene-
tration declines.
38
The continuing price increases in the postderegulation environ-
ment then suggest that demand was shifting outward over time. The
most straightforward explanation of that is that new channels were
added to basic cable packages while more desirable programming was
being telecast on existing channels. That can explain the annual price
increases in excess of inflation beyond 1987 and 1988 and is consis-
tent with the rapidly rising expenditures for programming inputs into
cable service. Moreover, it is the only explanation consistent with the
rising penetration rate.
The book adequately explains the supply-side of the equation, but
fails to fully examine the forces underpinning the demand. The analysis
appears to support the view that cable subscribers were willing to pay
higher rates as long as the product's quality increased. Hence, deregulation
should have led to a well-balanced market and price-quality equilibrium,
but it did not.
Indeed, no accounting is made of the consumer dissatisfaction with
cable pricing following deregulation, which created tremendous political
will to pass the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992. In fact, such legislation was the only veto by President Bush
that was overridden by Congress.40 The 1992 Cable Act was adopted in an
election year, and politicians surely felt compelled to act, presumably from
consumer concerns or complaints and not just by lobbyists for special in-
37. HAZL=r & SpIrZER, supra note 3, at 76.
38. Id. at 83.
39. Id. at 76.
40. Id. at 102.
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terest groups such as the telephone industry, programmers, and broadcast-
ers. The authors acknowledge this and note that Congress was "[s]purred
by customer complaints concerning poor service, high prices, and monop-
oly arrogance.",4' Again, the authors do not fully explain why consumers
perceived that escalating cable rates were not justified by the improved
service quality their data allegedly supports.
In contrast, the inability of the 1992 Cable Act, as implemented by
the FCC, to cause a decrease in rates with service improvements is amply
shown.42 The book even contains a footnote reference to a 1995 poll by a
cable industry magazine that showed that 62 percent of U.S. citizens did
not "think the 1992 Cable Act in fact accomplished what it was supposed
to. 43 Curiously, Chapter Six, The Economic Effects of Reregulation, 1993-
1994, concedes that "[t]he evidence suggests that the first of the two crite-
ria necessary for successful, proconsumer price controls-price ceilings
that bind on market prices-was met." 4 The book argues, however, that
the FCC-imposed rate freeze and rate decreases totaling 17 percent went
too far and caused a slowing of subscriber and programming growth.45 The
chapter also closely examines "whether controls were sufficient to lower
. .... ,,46
effective, quality-adjusted prices, prompting sales to rise. The authors
conclude that they were not.47 The authors imply this failure was caused at
least in part by the ineffectiveness of the FCC to implement rate rules.4a On
the other hand, the book does not criticize the numerous examples it gives
of cable companies' attempts to evade rate regulation by exploiting poten-
tial loopholes in the law and regulations.49
The authors argue that the FCC, with its high turnover and sudden
bureaucratic growth, was not up to the task of "rein[ing] in the profit-
maximizing behavior of 11,000 cable systems, each with its own manage-
rial staff-all with far greater knowledge of the cable television industry
than all but a handful of FCC employees."' ° In fact, the book goes on to
cite many FCC rule reversals, policy inconsistencies, and even typographi-
41. Id. at 59.
42. See id. at 194.
43. Id. at 102 n.l.
44. Id. at 110.
45. Id. at 114, 128, 132-33.
46. Id. at 110.
47. Id. at 194.
48. Id. at 175.
49. Id. at 144. The book also does not mention that Congress gave the FCC authority to
prevent cable operator evasions of the 1992 Cable Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(h) (1994). In
practice, however, the FCC has shied away from using this power.
50. HAZLETr& SPrrZER, supra note 3, at 170.
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cal errors by the FCC's Cable Services Bureau in its regulations and
forms. '
The book ascribes much of the problems of rate regulation to what it
calls a "regulatory dance" between the FCC and cable operators. 2 This
entails at the same time both the collusive, self-serving behavior between
the cable industry and the FCC as well as a chase of multiple foxes (cable
operators) by the single hound (the FCC). The book points to the FCC's
timing of the issuance of its "going-forward" rules, which generally loos-
ened rate regulation, until after the 1994 congressional elections as evi-
dence of political motivations and less than pure regulatory intentions.53
This is described as the "'dirty little secret"' between the FCC and the ca-
ble industry: "to behave publicly as though rate regulation is working
splendidly" in order to avoid a public outcry for additional regulation.
4
The book determines that regulatory capture is present in the cable
industry.55 The authors clearly set forth the inherent tension at the FCC,
which is not unique to that agency, of regulating an industry on one hand
while trying to promote it on the other. This dichotomy probably exacer-
bated ineffective rate reregulation.
In addition, the book is replete with instances of cable operator ef-
forts to, in some cases, mute the effects of rate regulation and in others to
outright thwart it.5 6 For example, the book identifies the following 1994
quote from an interview of John Malone, the chief executive officer of
Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), the then-largest cable company:
These noxious FCC rules are not going to be able to constrain the eco-
nomics of entertainment for very long. What's gonna [sic] happen is
there'll be a shift from [regulated] basic to [unregulated] 6 la carte
services....
We'll continue to diversify away from the regulated government-
attacked core. And meanwhile, we'll continue to slug it out in the
trenches in the domestic cable business, recognizing that the govern-
ment's got to kill a lot of smaller cable operators before they can really
hurt us much.57
Although not quite a Winston Churchill call to arms, the authors use
the preceding quote to exemplify what they call "conventional wisdom
51. Id. at 170-75.
52. Id. at 102.
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id. at 151 n.92.
55. Id. at 216.
56. Id. at 179.
57. Id. at 136-37.
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within the cable television industry."" What is ironic is that two months
before Mr. Malone made his statement, the cable television industry stock
index began a steady rise including a 50 percent increase from April 20,
1994 through July 1995.' 9 Further, the book does not mention that several
large investors, such as Microsoft and Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen
have recently invested billions of dollars in cable companies. The cable in-
dustry thus appears to have weathered the regulation storm fairly well.
The book offers no solutions to the regulatory conundrum it presents:
If regulation was ineffective and consumers are not well served by regula-
tion, then what is the alternative when consumers are not satisfied
(contrary to the economic indicators) during deregulation? Although com-
petition is seen as the regulator's panacea, the book does not give any indi-
cation as to how competition can be stimulated. Many hoped multichannel
video competition was made more likely by the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (particularly by removal of the telephone company/cable televi-
sion cross-ownership ban), but it has yet to produce what most observers
believe are significant results.60
In sum, the book answers the question it poses of "what can regula-
tors regulate?" by stating that "quality-adjusted cable rates are one item
they cannot effectively regulate in the U.S. economy.' Moreover, the
authors argue that the burden of proof should be shifted so that regulation
must be defended as a feasible alternative in the absence of competition.
But to consumers, that is academic and misses the point. The real world
question is: What is the best means to achieve the desired outcome of
58. Id. at 137.
59. Id. at 150.
60. The FCC issued a news release on December 17, 1998, prior to releasing its Fifth
Annual Report on competition in markets for the delivery of video programming. The news
release indicates:
The Report finds that competitive alternatives and consumer choices are still
developing but that cable television continues to be the primary delivery technol-
ogy for the distribution of multichannel video programming and continues to oc-
cupy a dominant position in the multichannel video programming delivery
("MVPD") marketplace. As of June 1998, 85% of all MVPD subscribers received
video programming service from local franchised cable operators compared to
87% a year earlier. The cable industry has continued to grow in terms of sub-
scriber penetration, channel capacity, the number of programming services avail-
able, revenues, audience ratings, and expenditures on programming.
Cable Services Action; Commission Adopts Fifth Annual Report on Competition in Video
Markets (CS Docket No. 98-102), News, Rep. No. CS 98-18, 1998 FCC LEXIS 6366, at
*1-*2 (Dec. 17, 1998).
61. HAZLEr & SPITZER, supra note 3, at 216.
62. Id. at 217.
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lower (or constrained rates), better quality, and improved service? This
book does not hazard a guess.

